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Avena as a Challenge to the Federal American Legal System 
 
Willem van Genugten∗ 
Introduction: Avena 2004 
 
 
In January 2003, Mexico instituted proceedings before the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) regarding violations of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
allegedly committed by the USA.1 The application stated that the USA in the case of the 
arrest and sentencing of 52 Mexican nationals had violated its international legal 
obligations to Mexico: 
 
in its own right and in the exercise of its right to diplomatic protection of its nationals, by 
failing to inform, without delay, the 52 Mexican nationals after their arrest of their right 
to consular notification and access under Article 36 (1) (b) of the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations, and by depriving Mexico of its right to provide consular protection 
and the 52 nationals’ right to receive such protection as Mexico would provide under 
Article 36 (1) (a) and (c) of the Convention.2  
 
After an Order for provisional measures of February 2003, stating that the USA ‘shall 
take all measures necessary to ensure that … [three of the Mexicans being the most urgent 
cases on death row] are not executed pending final judgment in these proceedings,’3 in its 
March 2004 Judgment the ICJ found, that the USA had violated several articles of the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. It also found: 
 
[t]hat the appropriate reparation in this case consists in the obligation of the United States 
of America to provide, by means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of the 
convictions and sentences of the Mexican nationals referred to […].4  
                                                     
∗ Professor of International Law, Tilburg University. 
 
1 Case concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), International 
Court of Justice. See Avena case on the Hague Justice Portal: http://www.haguejusticeportal.net.  
2 International Court of Justice, Avena and other Mexican nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) 
(2003-2004): Judgment, 31 March 2004 (hereafter, Judgment of 31 March 2004), para. 14 (1). 
3 International Court of Justice, Avena and other Mexican nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), 
Order of 5 February 2003, Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures (hereafter Order of 5 February 
2003), para. 59 (a). 
4 Judgment of 31 March 2004, para. 153(9), emphasis added. 
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The judgment means that the Court recognizes ‘that the concrete modalities for such 
review and reconsideration should be left primarily to the United States,’5 as it already had 
done in the LaGrand case. However, the judgment also specifies that this freedom in the 
choice of means for such review is not without qualification. Indeed, the Court decided that 
it should be carried out ‘by taking account of the violation of the rights,’6 set forth in the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.  
 
The Court also makes abundantly clear in its 2004 Judgment, that ‘it is not the 
convictions and sentences of the Mexican nationals which are to be regarded as a violation 
of international law, but solely certain breaches of treaty obligations which preceded 
them.’7 In other words: it is not up to the ICJ to decide whether or not the states within the 
USA have the right to use the death penalty. In that respect, it is interesting to note that 
Mexico contended, inter alia, that the right to consular notification and consular 
communication under the Vienna Convention is a human right of such a fundamental 
nature that its infringement will ipso facto produce the effect of vitiating the entire process 
of the criminal proceedings conducted in violation of this fundamental right. The ICJ 
observes that the question of whether or not the Vienna Convention rights are human rights 
‘is not a matter that this Court need decide’.8 One can imagine that in 2004, the Mexican 
authorities were both glad – victory! – and disappointed – the Judgment is not going far 
enough! – at the same time.  
 
 
Additional ICJ steps in 2008 
 
It was not until 2008 before Mexico brought its dispute to the ICJ again. It did so with 
a Request for Interpretation of the March 2004 Judgment as well as (again) a Request for 
the indication of provisional measures. The latter related to the fact that for one Mexican 
citizen the date for his execution was set, while four more Mexican nationals were ‘in 
imminent danger of having execution dates set by the State of Texas.’9 In its Request for 
Interpretation, Mexico is seeking for ‘guidance as to the scope and meaning of the 
remedial obligations incumbent upon the United States’.10 It is specifically asking the 
Court to clarify that the core obligation set forth in the Avena Judgment is an obligation of 
result and not merely an obligation of means, as Mexico contends the USA interprets it. 
 
At the time of writing (October 2008), the Court is looking at the merits of the case. 
Before that stage is complete, however, it had to decide on the request for provisional 
                                                     
5 Judgment of 31 March 2004, para. 131. 
6 Ibid, para. 131. 
7 Ibid, para. 123. 
8 Ibid, para.. 124. 
9 International Court of Justice, Application Instituting Proceedings, Request for Interpretation of Judgment 
in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (United Mexican States v. United States of 
America), 5 June 2008 (hereafter, Application Instituting Proceedings, 5 June 2008) para. 4. 
10 Application Instituting Proceedings, 5 June 2008, Preamble. 
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measures asking not to execute the death penalty as long as there is no ICJ Judgment on 
the merits. On 16 July it rendered its decision on the request for provisional measures. In 
its Order for provisional measures, the Court deals amongst other things with the 
‘obligation of result’ or ‘obligation of means’ argument. On that issue, the Court finds that:  
 
While it seems both Parties regard [the core of] the Avena Judgment as an international 
obligation of result, the Parties nonetheless apparently hold different views as to the 
meaning and scope of that obligation of result, namely, whether that understanding is 
shared by all United States federal and state authorities and whether that obligation falls 
upon those authorities.11  
 
In other words, an ‘obligation of result’ exists, but to whom exactly does it apply given 
the composite way the USA is constructed and the division of authority and legislative 
powers between the federal US government and the separate States? In relation to this 
issue, the Court observes:  
 
that the United States has recognized that “it is responsible under international law for the 
actions of its political subdivisions”, including “federal, state, and local officials”, and 
that its own international responsibility would be engaged if, as a result of acts or 
omissions by any of those political subdivisions, the United States was unable to respect 
its international obligations under the Avena Judgment.12  
 
The Court also observes that ‘in particular, the Agent of the United States 
acknowledged before the Court that “the United States would be responsible, clearly, under 
the principle of State responsibility for the internationally wrongful actions of [state] 
officials.” ’13 
  
After having observed Mexico’s declaration that there “can be no question about the 
urgency of the need for provisional measures”,14 the Court then comes to the conclusion 
that:  
 
The United States of America shall take all measures necessary to ensure […] that [the 
five Mexicans] are not executed pending judgment on the Request for interpretation 
submitted by the United Mexican States, unless and until these five Mexican nationals 
receive review and reconsideration consistent with […] Avena.15 
 
So far so good. But it is surprising to note that this Order was issued with only a seven 
to five majority. What were the arguments against? It comes as no surprise that the core 
arguments against were tabled in a dissenting opinion of US Judge Buergenthal. According 
to him there is no disagreement on the question of whether or not the Avena Judgment 
leads to an obligation of result, but rather the judge was concerned with the central issue 
                                                     
11 Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case concerning Avena and Other 
Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. USA), Order of 16 July 2008 (hereafter Order of 16 July 2008), para. 55. 
Emphasis added. 
12 Order of 16 July 2008, para. 77. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid, para. 21. 
15Ibid, para. 80 II (a). 
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that Mexico presented ‘no evidence whatsoever to support its contention that the Parties 
are in a disagreement regarding the meaning or scope of that paragraph of the Avena 
Judgment.’16 Judge Buergenthal continues, stating that here there ‘is a claim by one of the 
Parties only regarding the existence of a dispute that is not supported by any relevant 
evidence before the Court.’17 In addition, the American Judge states that the Order adds 
nothing to the obligations the United States continues to have under the Avena Judgment, 
‘namely, not to execute any of the Mexican nationals unless they have been provided the 
review and reconsideration pursuant to that Judgment.’18  
 
Three other Judges – Owada, Tomka and Keith – said that they regretted that they were 
unable to support the Court’s Order, their argument being that ‘humanitarian 
considerations which clearly underlie the decision cannot override the legal requirements 
of the Statute of the Court.’19 In their view, Mexico has failed to make clear that there is a 
dispute between the USA and Mexico about the meaning or scope of Avena, that for that 
reason the Application for Interpretation should be dismissed, and therefore the request for 
provisional measures should also be dismissed since there would be no pending proceeding 
to which it would be related. Finally, according to dissenting Judge Skotnikov the Court 
has taken a wrong route. According to him there is no lack of clarity as to Avena, 
accordingly the real issue is not a matter of interpretation but of simply living up to Avena. 
 
 
In the meantime in the USA 
 
While we await the ICJ Judgment on the Request for Interpretation, it is interesting to 
see how the USA reacted internally to the 2004 Judgment. There have been two 
milestones, one might say. The first is the publication of a Memorandum on the issue by 
President Bush, supporting the ICJ, the second is a Judgement by the US Supreme Court 





The first is the 2005 Memorandum by US President George W. Bush to the US 
Attorney General, determining that the US will fulfill its international obligations 
following the ICJ Judgment ‘by having State courts give effect to the decision in 
accordance with general principles of comity’. 20  The statement led to an extensive 
                                                     
16 ‘Dissenting opinion of Judge Buergenthal’, Annex to the Summary of the Order, 16 July 2008, para. 4. 
17 Order of 16 July 2008, Dissenting Opinion Judge Buergenthal, para 25. 
18 ‘Dissenting opinion of Judge Buergenthal’, Annex to the Summary of the Order, 16 July 2008, para. 4. 
19 Order of 16 July 2008, Dissenting Opinion Judges Owada, Tomka and Keith, para. 1. 
20  Memorandum ‘Compliance with the Decision of the International Court of Justice in Avena’, dated 
February 28, 2005, International legal materials, Nº 4, 2005, pp. 964-965. Emphasis added. 
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US Supreme Court Judgement 
 
The second is the Supreme Court Judgment of March 2008 in the case Medellín v. 
Texas. Medellín – the Mexican national for whom the execution date had been set – argued 
that the President’s Memorandum is a valid exercise of his “Take Care” power. The 
Supreme Court thought otherwise:  
  
While a treaty may constitute an international commitment, it is not binding domestic law 
unless Congress has enacted statutes implementing it or the treaty itself conveys an 
intention that it be ‘self-executing’ and is ratified on that basis. […] The President’s 
authority to act, as with the exercise of any governmental power, ‘must stem either from 
an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.22  
 
And even more tellingly, the Supreme Court decided that the President’s authority allows 
him ‘to execute the laws, not make them.’23 This leads the Supreme Court to the overall 
decision that ‘the Avena judgment is not domestic law’, that ‘accordingly, the President 
cannot rely on his Take Care powers here’, and that ‘the judgment of the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals is affirmed.’24  
 
 
Dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer 
 
This is, no doubt, an understandable and defensible reasoning. Be that as it may, the 
truth it seems is never that easy; no truth without another truth accompanying it. How 
about the dissenting opinion, worded by Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Souter and 
Ginsburg? They claim that the US Constitution’s Supremacy Clause provides that ‘all 
Treaties […] which shall be made […] under the Authority of the United States, shall be 
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby.’25 The 
Clause means, according to the dissenting opinion, that courts must regard a treaty as 
equivalent to an act of the legislature, ‘whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any 
legislative provision.’26 Framing the problem this way, Justice Breyer comes up with an 
interesting argument: in the previously mentioned Memorandum ‘President Bush has 
determined that domestic courts should enforce… [Avena] … and that […] Congress has 
                                                     
21 See recently Jordan J. Paust, “Medellín, Avena, The Supremacy of Treaties, and Relevant Executive 
Authority”, Suffolk Transnational Law Review, Vol. 31, nr. 2, 2008, p. 301-333. The article includes a wealth 
of literature.   
22 US Supreme Court Decision - Medellin v. Texas, 25 March 2008, para. 1 (a). 
23 US Supreme Court Decision - Medellin v. Texas, 25 March 2008, Opinion of the Court, para. 3. 
24 Ibid. 
25 US Supreme Court Decision - Medellin v. Texas, 25 March 2008, Dissenting opinion Justice Breyer, p. 1. 
26 Ibid. 
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done nothing to suggest the contrary.’27 And, under these circumstances, Justice Breyer 
continues by affirming: ‘I believe the treaty obligations, and hence the judgment, resting as 
it does upon the consent of the United States to the ICJ’s jurisdiction, bind the courts no 
less than would “an act of the [federal] legislature”.’28 That ‘belief’ is followed by a range 
of arguments that go beyond the scope of this commentary. Let me select the most 
pertinent ones that give a clear insight into the debate for international lawyers as well: 
 
• The dispute arises at the intersection of an individual right with ordinary rules of 
criminal procedure. Yet, Justice Breyer observes that the Supreme Court has found 
treaty provisions on similar procedural matters self-executing. Moreover, the 
provision language of the Vienna Convention is precise according to the Supreme 
Court judge. For these reasons, “it is consequently not surprising that, when 
Congress ratified the Convention, the State Department reported that the 
‘Convention is considered entirely self-executive and does not require any 
implementing or complementing legislation.’ ”29 
• “(…) logic suggests that a treaty provision providing ‘final’ and ‘binding’ judgments 
that ‘settle’ treaty-based disputes is self-executing insofar as the judgment in 
question concerns the meaning of an underlying treaty provision that is itself self-
executing.”30 And: “What sense would it make (1) to make a self-executing promise 
and (2) to promise to accept as final an ICJ judgment interpreting that self-executing 
promise, yet (3) to insist that the judgment itself is not self-executing (i.e., that 
Congress must enact specific legislation to enforce it)?”31 
• “(…) the majority’s very different approach has seriously negative practical 
implications. The United States has entered into at least 70 treaties that contain 
provisions for ICJ dispute settlement similar to (…) the Protocol before us”,32 and 
“many of these treaties contain provisions similar to those this Court has previously 
found self-executing – provisions that involve, for example, property rights, contract 
and commercial rights, trademarks, civil liability for personal injury, rights of 
foreign diplomats, taxation, domestic-court jurisdiction, and so forth.”33 
• “(…) to find the United States’ treaty obligations self-executing as applied to the ICJ 
judgment (and consequently to find that judgment enforceable) does not threaten 
constitutional conflict with other branches; it does not require us to engage in non 
judicial activity; and it does not require us to create a new cause of action. The only 
question before us concerns the application of the ICJ judgment as binding law 
applicable to the parties in a particular criminal proceeding that Texas law creates 
independently of the treaty. I repeat that the question before us does not involve the 
                                                     
27 Medellin v. Texas, 25 March 2008, Dissenting opinion Justice Breyer, p. 2. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Medellin v. Texas, 25 March 2008, Dissenting opinion Justice Breyer, p. 20. 
30 Ibid, pp. 20-21. 
31 Ibid, p. 21. 
32 Ibid, p. 23. 
33 Ibid, pp. 23-24. 
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creation of a private right of action (and the majority’s reliance on authority 
regarding such a circumstance is misplaced).”34 
 
All this (and much more) leads Justice Breyer to the conclusion that the United States’ 
obligation following from Avena is enforceable in court “without further congressional 
action beyond Senate ratification of the relevant treaties.”35 According to him, the majority 
comes to a different conclusion “because it looks for the wrong thing (explicit textual 
expression about self-execution) using the wrong standard (clarity) in the wrong place (the 
treaty language).”36 And by doing so, the Supreme Court’s majority, according to Justice 
Breyer, “threatens to deprive individuals, including businesses, property owners, 
testamentary beneficiaries, consular officials, and others, of the workable dispute 
resolution procedures that many treaties, including commercially oriented treaties, 
provide.”37 It is interesting to see that he does not play the card of human rights as lex 
specialis and the like, but on the contrary, that he links the present (at least human rights-
related) case to cases in such fields as commerce and trade. I see the relevance and 
correctness of the majority’s core arguments, but I personally favor Breyer’s dissenting 
route. Let’s see what the ICJ will do.  
 
 
The fate of José Ernesto Medellín Rojas 
 
José Ernesto Medellín Rojas was executed, as scheduled, on 5 August 2008. The Texan 
authorities felt that they could neglect the relevant ICJ Order, thereby supported by the US 
Supreme Court and hindered by the US Federal Administration. Medellín’s case did lead to 
a range of intriguing questions on the relation between international law and US law and 
on the way the US President and the US Supreme Court disagree on a series of legal issues. 
It is hugely regrettable, however, that it did not save his life, or at least that the US 
Supreme Court and the authorities in Texas did not find grounds to wait with the execution 
until the ICJ will have decided on the merits. 
 
                                                     
34 Ibid, pp. 25-26. 
35 Ibid, p. 26. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Medellin v. Texas, 25 March 2008, Dissenting opinion Justice Breyer, p. 26. 
